Issues with Presenting and Understanding Data

Aid Thoughts has an interesting post from yesterday on Hans Rosling and the presentation of data. 

Rosling is a Swedish statistician who has done some great work on data visualization as it relates to traditional development issues (poverty, health care, education).  He's also a sword swallower (starting at 18:30 in this video).  But he's most famous for a couple of Ted talks, like the one below, where he shows changes in poverty levels and human development since the early 1800s.

The above video, btw, is the 7th most watched TED talk of all time.  

What Aid Watch comments on, however, is another, more recent talk he gave in Doha (see below), where the razzle dazzle of the visuals seems to obscure the message.  This is important, of course, because the message is what matters most for decision making. Focusing on what the data looks like, as opposed to what the data means, is a great way to get yourself in trouble.  I have bad memories of when I was in Iraq with the Army and spent way too many hours putting together PowerPoint slides that would be looked at for 30 seconds, when that time would have been better spent trying to understand what the underlying causes behind the trends were, not to mention whether or not the data was reliable and the metric we were using was even valid as an indicator of success.  

What also bothers Aid Watch are the "broad" conclusions Rosling draws from the data and his discounting of the role religion plays in country fertility rates.  Rosling addresses the religion/fertility rate issue for two reasons, first, because most people believe there is a limit to how large a population the earth can handle is (hello, Malthus), and second, because some folks believe religion plays a decisive role in high fertility rates.  Rosling seeks to destroy this latter argument and argues that we've reached "Peak Child," where as with "peak" anything, the trend either levels off or starts to decrease.

Rosling makes the case that fertility is more dependent upon variables such as child mortality rates, the need for child labor participation, women's education levels, and the accessibility of "family planning" services.  Yet, the question not being looked at, according to AW, is whether or not religion plays a determinant factor with these variables.  It's a good point.  If it does, it then follows that religion plays a significant role in fertility rates.  This is important  to know because understanding causality impacts your decision making for where and how to allocate limited resources.   Another development blog, A View From The Cave, also tackles the issue.  

I bring this up because lately I've been doing a lot of research on data analysis in conflict stabilization and development situations and sorting out causality is an incredibly difficult task.  If Rosling is right, then if you want to lower birth rates, you target the variables he mentions.  But if he's wrong, you need to do something like trying to influence religious leaders who can sway the population.  It makes sense, after all, to address the root cause of a problem as opposed to something in the middle.  There is only so much time and money that practitioners have  to address problems and sussing out true causality is particularly important when lives are at stake.

In Iraq and Afghanistan it seems that we haven't done a good job connecting our goals with our metrics for measuring progress, or making sure our data was both reliable and valid as indicators of success. Since the blog is back up, this is an issue I hope to cover a lot more in the future (in'shallah).

Back Again

Over a year ago I uploaded my last post.  

I kinda gave up on the blog because I started a new line of research and thinking not related to conflict stabilization or development issues and wanted to explore it in depth with the goal of producing something publishable.   It essentially dealt the concept of victimhood, brought on in large part by my experience of living an extended period in the U.S. for the first time in almost a decade. I noticed a lot of whining and complaining by Americans, many of whom seemed to be spoiled and have an unwarranted sense of entitlement.  These people seemed to not understand how good they have it here, and blamed others (corporations, the government, "rich people," etc.) for problems of their own making.  They didn't want to take responsibility for the consequences of their own freely chosen life choices, and preferred to play the victim in order to get someone else to pay or be responsible in their stead.  

After my experience of living in Iraq and traveling through the Middle East, I found it all to be quite disturbing, and upon returing to Baghdad in early 2011, I rediscovered how much I enjoyed being around people who focused more on helping others and accomplishing things than complaining about what they did or didn't have.  And it was good to be working with people really in need and who would greatly appreciate having the problems Americans complain about.

The other reason was I needed to finish a big paper that basically took until the Fall to complete. I'm publishing it here.  It's about the evolution of United Nations Peace Support Operations since 2001.  It comes in at about 80 pages and 20,000 words.  If you want to know the major ideas behind the way UN peacekeeping missions do business and the key documents associated with them, then it's worth a read.

The Reform of UN Peace Operations

I wrote this paper to finish the final requirement for a Certificate of Training in UN Peace Support Operations.  It's a certification you can get from the Peace Operations Training Institute.  If you want to work in a UN peacekeeping mission, or learn about them, the program is worth checking out.  I found the experience to be very valuable.  A friend of mine who I turned on to the program later got a job with the UN and she told me the interviewer seemed to be impressed that she had done the program.  You can take a free course here on Principles and Guidelines for UN Peacekeeping Operations.  Or you can just download the doctrine and study it on your own.

I have a few more papers I'll publish in the next few weeks on the topic of Afghanistan, and which I wrote for some of my graduate classes.  

Notes on USAID

For the last month I’ve been preparing a class on Iraqi politics for military units rotating into Iraq to finish out Operation New Dawn, which transitioned from Operation Iraqi Freedom last October, and which is scheduled to end once the Security Agreement between Iraq and the United States expires on December 31^st of this year.

Classes ended yesterday and I’m happy to say mine went off rather well, which is a relief since it is my primary deliverable on this contract, and it had been a long time since I spoke in front of a group of about a hundred people. With that complete, it’s time to update the blog.

Last month, at the Center for Global Development, (the CNAS of the development community), USAID Administrator Rajiv Shah delivered a major speech entitled: “The Modern Development Enterprise.” The speech, available here, goes into detail about the steps USAID has been taking and will continue to take in order to transform into “the world’s premier aid agency.”

Shah began by describing the Obama Administration’s approach to development as one that is “focused on sustainable economic growth, committed to mutual accountability, [and] selective in scope and concentrating foremost on results.” He then went on to discuss in depth how USAID has been executing that approach and highlighted the need for continuing to do so because “development is as critical to our economic prospects and national security as diplomacy and defense.”

He mentioned that one way USAID has been attempting to change the way it does business is by focusing more on strengthening the internal government systems of a developing country to provide public services for its citizenry, as opposed to USAID just providing various forms of aid to populations. Says Shah: “Instead of merely providing food aid in times of emergency, we are helping countries develop their own agricultural sectors so they can feed themselves.” And when it comes to health care, “instead of scattered approaches that fight individual diseases one at a time, we are pursuing an integrated approach that will generate efficiencies and strengthen health systems.”

Additional institutional improvements enacted recently include an attempt at procurement reform, the creation of a policy planning and learning bureau, and the reestablishment of USAID’s budget office.

Shah went on to announce USAID’s new evaluation policy, the big takeaway from the speech, which hopefully leads to more learning, accountability, and better results in the way U.S. taxpayer dollars are spent. The new policy emerged, Shah notes:

“[Because] the results [implementing partners] claim often have little grounding in fact . . . [there often exists] a relationship between implementing partners and evaluators akin to that between investment banks and ratings agencies. Just like investors couldn’t tell the difference between AAA bonds and junk, taxpayers can’t tell the difference between development breakthroughs and subprime development.”

So from now on, he says:

“Every major project will require a performance evaluation conducted by independent third parties, not by the implementing partners themselves. Instead of simply reporting our results like nearly all aid agencies do, we will collect baseline data and employ study designs that explain what would have happened without our interventions so we can know for sure the impact of our programs.”

Shah then committed to releasing the results of all evaluations within three months of their completion, “whether they tell a story of success or failure,” and that the data would be integrated into the foreignassistance.gov dashboard.

“I want the American taxpayer to know,” says Shah, “that every dollar they invest in USAID is being invested in the smartest, most efficient and most transparent way possible.”

You can find the entire evaluations policy here.

In the rest of his speech Shah covered USAID’s plans on attracting more talented employees, attempts at cracking down on fraud, waste and abuse by building a culture of oversight, and in general, his plans for running USAID more like a business that focuses on results, holding people accountable, and getting the most bang for the taxpayer dollar. Key to doing so, he says, is by creating structures and a culture that supports initiative and innovation on the part of the workforce.

My thoughts after reading the speech are that USAID seems to be doing a whole lot more to address the organizational challenges associated with running the agency, as opposed to focusing on actual programs overseas. This is a good thing. Addressing both are certainly important, but you can’t really do the latter successfully until you’ve first tailored organizational systems and culture in a manner most conducive to achieving your goals. This is especially important in stabilization situations. Failure to do so has been the subject of much criticism in the wake of Iraq and Afghanistan.

Shah’s reforms are more focused on true development (economic growth and capacity building) as opposed to post-conflict stabilization activities, but they none the less make sense since USAID’s primary mission is development and by strengthening weak states we can help prevent them from turning into failed states where conflict erupts. By developing a culture in which people and organizations are held accountable and where evaluations are transparent, USAID will be able to do a better job in the future, regardless of the nature of its involvement.

Back to Iraq

Over a month ago I published my most recent blog post and since then a lot has changed.  In December I was at Duke’s Sanford School and studying for a Master’s in International Development while consulting for a start-up called Statecraft.  Now I’m in Fort Benning, Georgia, and getting ready to fly to Iraq where I’ll be working as an instructor at the U.S. military’s Counterinsurgency and Stability Academy in Baghdad.

In the interim, a couple cool things have happened. . .

My friend Paul Miller published a piece in Foreign Affairs on how to “Finish the Job” in Afghanistan.  We’ve known each other since our time as undergrads at Georgetown and happen to share very similar career paths.  He’s the only one of my friends from college who does the kind of work I do.  He also blogs on Foreign Policy’s Shadow Government and teaches courses on state-building at the National Defense University. 

The Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review was also released.  For those of you tracking issues related to stabilization and state-building, plus humanitarian aid and international development, this is a very important event, though what actual impact it will have is up in the air.  The QDDR is the State Department’s and USAID’s version of the Quadrennial Defense Review, which the Pentagon uses to guide its operations and express its thinking about current and future conflicts.  As expected, the best commentary comes from the folks at the Center for Global Development and the numbers crunchers at the Stimson Center’s blog The Will and the Wallet.  Josh Rogin at Foreign Policy also has a good summary of the document and can be relied on for updates on all things development and diplomacy related.  The QDDR is about a month old, but something folks planning on working for the U.S. government foreign policy positions should get to know, especially if they’re involved in D3. 

As for me, I plan on returning to Duke, most likely for the spring 2012 semester.  My teaching job is supposed to last until August, but rather than going back for the fall, I’ll see if I can hop over to Afghanistan.  If not, I’ll spend the rest of my time in Central or South America where I’ll travel, surf, write, and learn as much Spanish as I can.    

I hadn’t planned on taking a leave of absence and heading back to Iraq, especially since I was enjoying living in the U.S. again.  In the middle of finals the position came up and I realized the experience of teaching and traveling the country (when classes aren’t in session we visit units on the ground to evaluate operations, local conditions, and what lessons can be learned) is something I can’t pass up, especially since the U.S. military presence in Iraq is supposed to end later this year.  While I’ve enjoyed my time at Duke studying international development, I’m looking forward to spending some time with a group of people whose lives revolve around thinking about things like stabilization, counterinsurgency, and state-building. 

Plus, for some weird reason, I really do love being in Iraq.

What I think about the Wikileaks info dump . . .

Basically, the same thing as Secretary of Defense Robert Gates:

First of all, I would say unlike the Pentagon Papers, one of the things that is important, I think, in all of these releases, whether it’s Afghanistan, Iraq or the releases this week, is the lack of any significant difference between what the U.S. government says publicly and what these things show privately, whereas the Pentagon Papers showed that many in the government were not only lying to the American people, they were lying to themselves.

But let me – let me just offer some perspective as somebody who’s been at this a long time. Every other government in the world knows the United States government leaks like a sieve, and it has for a long time. And I dragged this up the other day when I was looking at some of these prospective releases. And this is a quote from John Adams: “How can a government go on, publishing all of their negotiations with foreign nations, I know not. To me, it appears as dangerous and pernicious as it is novel.”

When we went to real congressional oversight of intelligence in the mid-’70s, there was a broad view that no other foreign intelligence service would ever share information with us again if we were going to share it all with the Congress. Those fears all proved unfounded.

Now, I’ve heard the impact of these releases on our foreign policy described as a meltdown, as a game-changer, and so on. I think – I think those descriptions are fairly significantly overwrought. The fact is, governments deal with the United States because it’s in their interest, not because they like us, not because they trust us, and not because they believe we can keep secrets.

Many governments – some governments deal with us because they fear us, some because they respect us, most because they need us. We are still essentially, as has been said before, the indispensable nation. So other nations will continue to deal with us. They will continue to work with us. We will continue to share sensitive information with one another. Is this embarrassing? Yes. Is it awkward? Yes. Consequences for U.S. foreign policy? I think fairly modest.

Best.  SecDef.  Ever.

The GOP Landslide and Aid to Africa

Todd Moss and Stephanie Majerowicz over at the the Center for Global Development predict that starting soon, as a result of the recent election, aid to Africa will likely drop by $900 million per year beginning in 2012.  They analyzed U.S. aid flows to Africa between 1961-2008 and found that aid decreases significantly when the Presidency and Congress are controlled by different parties.  

This result is driven by different parties in the White House and on the Hill–not because Republicans are structurally anti-aid.  Yes, the GOP has plenty of vocal foreign aid critics, but the record is pretty clear.  In fact, ODA flows to Africa are highest under all Republican control, followed by all Democratic control.  The combination for the next two years–Democratic White House and Republican/split Congress–is actually the lowest configuration.

I would be interested in learning why it is that aid decreases.  My guess is that when a Democrat is in the White House, the Republicans pretty much oppose any increase in spending, regardless of what it's for.  Not sure what the cause would be when the situations are reversed. 

As for the why aid is greater when the Republican's control Congress and the Presidency, I'm guessing that (in the past) it has to do with increased aid to non-aligned countries during the Cold War as we competed against the Soviets for influence in Africa.  More recently, however, there was a dramatic increase under Bush the Younger who quadrupled aid to Africa, mainly to fight HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis and malaria.

Do Aid Shocks Cause Conflict?

The obvious (and right) answer is no.  Bad actors cause conflicts and an inability to agree on political control of the state may too.  The withdrawal of aid, whether for financial or political reasons, may make things more difficult and may correlate to a higher incidence of conflict in an aid-dependent country, but as we know, correlation does not equal causation.  There are probably a couple of dozen other "lurking" variables.

So it's a little disappointing that the authors of a study discussing the relationship between aid and the outbreak of violence title their post "Aid Shocks Likely Cause Armed Conflict"  and make the statement: "[t]he results give us greater confidence that aid shocks actually cause armed conflict" [emphasis mine]. Like most social science research, they qualify their conclusions — a typical CYA maneuver. 

You can find the full study here. 

My problem isn't so much with their data.  It does make sense that the withdrawal of aid and the recipient government’s resulting lack of funds can negatively impact the balance of power between the government and rebel forces.  The issue here is one of assigning responsibility and discerning the significance level of the correlation.  And by implying that ignorant or devious foreign powers are responsible for the conflict, rather than the perpetrators of the violence themselves (both rebels and the government), the authors fail to hold the right individuals/groups accountable.

And that's one of the main problems with so much development work: failing to hold the relevant parties responsible for their actions, whether they are intended beneficiaries, or the government receiving aid, or donors themselves.  For some reason, it's always the fault of someone or something else.

Robert Gates on "Public Business"

A few weeks ago Secretary of Defense Robert Gates spoke at my university and ended his speech with a favorite quote from former President John Adams, who in a letter to his son says:

"Public business, my son, must always be done by somebody.  It will be done by somebody or another.  If wise men decline it, others will not; if honest men refuse it, others will not."

Gates went on to ask:

"Will the wise and honest here at Duke come help us do the public business of America?  Because, if America’s best and brightest young people will not step forward, who then can we count on to protect and sustain the greatness of this country in the 21st century?"

You can find the full text of his speech here.

America's Debt a National Security Issue?

Via Repartay . . .

A good New York Times piece on the subject is here.

Money quote:

"The story of today’s deficits starts in January 2001, as President Bill Clinton was leaving office. The Congressional Budget Office estimated then that the government would run an average annual surplus of more than $800 billion a year from 2009 to 2012. Today, the government is expected to run a $1.2 trillion annual deficit in those years."

Two reasons:  Entitlement spending (Social Security and Medicare) and stupid wars.

As Elizabeth MacDonald notes, the national debt is a security issue.   The worry is that foreign countries (like China) can use their dollar reservers to destablize our currency. 

Some more quotes: 

“The biggest threat we have to our national security is our debt…the interest on our debt is $571 billion in 2012 and that’s notionally about the size of the Defense Department budget.  It’s not sustainable.”—Admiral Michael Mullen, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, June 2010

“We’ve reached a point now where there’s an intimate link between our solvency and our national security.”—Richard Haass, president, Council on Foreign Relations

“The Pentagon sponsored a first-of-its-kind war game..on how hostile nations might seek to cripple the U.S. economy,” with the weapons being stocks, bonds and currencies…” it was the first time the Pentagon hosted a purely economic war game.”—Politico.com, 2009 

“Several months ago, a group of logistics officers at the Industrial College of the Armed Forces developed a national security strategy as a class exercise.  Their No. 1 recommendation for maintaining U.S. global leadership was ‘restore fiscal responsibility.”—Washington Post, May 2010

Paul Collier on Stabilization

He makes the point I've been making for a long, long time.  Specifically, nothing you do really matters unless you have security, or something approximating it. 

Second, you need economic growth.  Both of these come before politics.  It sounds nice to say there are multiple "lines of operation" that must be carried out simultaneously, but that's not true.  You can have security without economic growth or democracy, but you can't have either of those two without security.

For those not familiar with him, Collier is a heavyweight in the development community.  His two books The Bottom Billion and Wars, Guns, and Votes: Democracy in Dangerous Places are considered required for development and stabilization practioners. 

Development and Dependence

One more nugget from Obama's UN Speech the other week:

"Our focus on assistance has saved lives in the short term, but it hasn't always improved those societies over the long-term.  Consider the millions of people who have relied on food assistance for decades. That's not development, that's dependence, and it's a cycle we need to break. Instead of just managing poverty, we have to offer nations and peoples a path out of poverty."

I appreciate the clarification of terms.  Perhaps we can stop using "nation-building" too.

New Interagency Reform Legislation

Via Small Wars Journal, we learn that Congressman Ike Skelton, Chair of the House Armed Services Committee, has introduced what has been called "groundbreaking" legislation to "overhaul interagency national security coordination."

According to SWJ, highlights include:

Creating a new interagency governance structure to develop interagency knowledge, skills, and experience among national security professionals;

Creating incentives for national security professionals to undertake-and their employing agencies to encourage-interagency education, training, and assignments;


Creating a consortium of colleges and universities to develop and offer consistent and effective interagency education and training opportunities; and


Requiring agencies to maintain staff levels to continue day-to-day functions and mission operations while national security professionals undertake professional education and training.

Click on the links to find the actual draft legisation, along with Chairman Skelton's speech introducing it, and a section-by-section summary of the bill.

Some additional info from Laura Hall, one of the best observers of stabilization operations, interagency issues, and "D3," can be found at the new Stimson Center blog: The Will and the Wallet.  Together with Jonathan M. Larkin she writes about some of the bills problems that could make it yet another unmet mandate.  It's worth a read.

Obama's Speech to the U.N. on U.S. Global Development Policy (Or, "It's the economy, stupid")

Here's President Obama's speech on America's new "Global Development Policy," given at last week's summit on the UN Millenium Development Goals:

Some quotes [emphasis mine]:

"I suspect that some in wealthier countries may ask-with our economies struggling, so many people out of work, and so many families barely getting by, why a summit on development? The answer is simple. In our global economy, progress in even the poorest countries can advance the prosperity and security of people far beyond their borders, including my fellow Americans."

"My national security strategy recognizes development as not only a moral imperative, but a strategic and economic imperative."

"For too long, we've measured our efforts by the dollars we spent and the food and medicines we delivered. But aid alone is not development. Development is helping nations to actually develop-moving from poverty to prosperity. And we need more than just aid to unleash that change. We need to harness all the tools at our disposal-from our diplomacy to our trade and investment policies."

"To unleash transformational change, we're putting a new emphasis on the most powerful force the world has ever known for eradicating poverty and creating opportunity. It's the force that turned South Korea from a recipient of aid to a donor of aid. It's the force that has raised living standards from Brazil to India. And it's the force that has allowed emerging African countries like Ethiopia, Malawi and Mozambique to defy the odds and make real progress toward achieving the Millennium Development Goals, even as some of their neighbors-like Cote d'Ivoire-have lagged behind.  The force I'm speaking of is broad-based economic growth. Now, every nation will pursue its own path to prosperity. But decades of experience tell us that there are certain ingredients upon which sustainable growth and lasting development depends."

Full text here.  If you don't understand the title of the post, see here.

Obama's Development Policy

President Obama spoke last week at the opening of the United Nation's Summit on the Millenium Development Goals (MDGs), and in his speech laid out his Administration's new Global Development Policy.

The best analysis I've seen so far is that of Connie Veillette who is with the Center for Global Development in New York.  She writes about the good, the bad, and "the uncertain."

The good, she says, is that now we have a plan in place, "one that sets objectives, clarifies approaches, and is results-oriented."  The bad, of course, is we "will seemingly continue to rely on a gaggle . . .  of government agencies to do development work," which as Rebecca Williams at the Budget Insight blog notes, involves "12 departments, 25 agencies and nearly 60 government offices."

And the uncertain?  Well that has to do with how the Obama Administration's new policy will be operationalized in addition to unresolved issues related to the role (or lack thereof) of USAID.

You can find the whole post here, along with some useful additional commentary by Nancy Birdsall, the founding president of the Center for Global Development, and a major player with a lot of influence in development circles.

Life Lesson of the Day . . .

Enjoy the ride.

Fallen from Sascha Geddert on Vimeo. 

A little meteor learns the biggest lesson of life on it's way down to earth.

Via Andrew Sullivan.